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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction over this Petition of Certification arises under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) (1987).
STATEMENT QF INTEREST QF AMICUS CURIAE
The Utah Trial Lawyers Association, Inc. consists of members of the Utah Bar who
seek to improve the quality of the adversary system in Utah. The UTLA exists as a nonprofit corporation, organized under Utah laws with corporate offices at
200 E a s t ,

Suite

103

S a l t Lake C i t y ,

Utah

645

South

84111

The UTLA has particular interest in this case because it concerns the
interpretation of the Utah Liability Reform Act, which vitally affects persons whom
UTLA members represent. UTLA members represent and "advance the cause of those
who are injured in person or property

and who must therefore seek redress."

(By-

Laws, art. 4 cl.4). If the Court interprets the Utah Liability Reform Act in a way which
would sustain the balance already created by the Utah legislature, that is, by completely
safeguarding the immunity already granted under Utah law, fair and adequate
compensation to these injured persons will continue.
Through their counsel, all parties have consented to the appearance of this
amicus.

STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES
This petition for certification focuses on the Utah Liability Reform Act of 1986,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37, et. seq. (1992).

Specifically, the Utah Trial Lawyers

Association seeks to have the Court answer whether, when determining fault in a
liability action, a jury may compromise immunity otherwise granted by law.

In other

words, does an immune entity remain protected throughout trial and therefore must be
excluded from any apportionment of fault on the special verdict form?
1

This brief will not address the Utah Constitutional issues which may originate
under Article XVI, § 5.
Because this case does not come to the Utah Supreme Court by way of appeal, no
standard of review, per se, applies. Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that the Court may answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the
United States. Under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(1) (1987), the Court possesses original
jurisdiction of this case.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1. et. seq. (1989).
Section 63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results
from the exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and
from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care
clinical training program conducted in either public of private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by
governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from
suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.
Utah Liability Reform Act. Utah Code Ann. SS 78-27-37. et. sea. M9921
(Addendum 1).
1.

Section 78-27-37.

Definitions

2. Section 78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
3. Section 78-27-39.
proportion of fault.
4. Section 78-27-40.
contribution.
5.

Separate special verdicts on total • damages and

Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault - No

Section 78-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
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6. Section 78-27-42.
defendants.

Release to one defendant does not discharge other

7. Section 78-27-43.
contribution.

Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity,

Utah Workers' Compensation Act Utah Code Ann, §§ 35-1-1. et, seq, (1988L
Section 35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent
or employee - Occupational disease excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of
this title for injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in
death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall
be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or employee of the
employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be
in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or
otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow, children, parents,
dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any
other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death,
in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such
employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his employment,
and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or against any
officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident,
injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section,, however, shall
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the
industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the
provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended.
STATEMENT QF THE- CASE
Cynthia Gines, on her own behalf and as guardian ad litem for her minor
children, filed this suit in the United States District Court, District of Utah. The causes
of action seek damages from Defendants for the wrongful death of Randy Gines, Plaintiffs'
husband and father.

Mrs. Gines claims that Defendants negligently designed,

manufactured and distributed a roof bolting machine which in turn caused Mr. Gines'
death in an underground coal mine accident. She also bases her suit on strict product
liability, asserting that Defendants' machine is a defective, unreasonably dangerous
product. (Order of Certification filed Nov. 8, 1991 at 3).

3

In response to Mrs. Gines' claims, Defendants deny all liability and contend that
Mr. Gines' employer, U.S. Fuel Co., bears responsibility for his death.
Certification, at 3).

Mrs. Gines disputes this claim.

(Order of

Under the Utah Workers'

Compensation Act, U.S. Fuel Co. pays Mrs. Gines statutory benefits and in turn, legally
cannot be charged with fault.

(Order of Certification, at 3; Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-

60).
Defendants concede, therefore, that U.S. Fuel's immunity protects it and they
cannot add it as a party to the suit.

(Order of Certification, at 4).

Nonetheless,

Defendant Ingersoll-Rand filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the jury consider U.S.
Fuel's conduct and assess it a portion of the fault, if any, on a special verdict form.
(Order of Certification, at 4.) Mrs. Gines opposed the motion and on May 21, 1991, the
District Court referred the matter to United States Magistrate Calvin Gould. (Order of
Certification, at 4.)
On June 25, 1991 Magistrate Gould issued an order denying Defendant's motion,
to which Defendant filed an Objection. (Order of Certification, at 4.) After the District
Court conducted a hearing on the issue, it deferred ruling on the Motion and the
Objection.

(Order of Certification, at 4.)

On November 8, 1991, the court filed a

Petition of Certification with the Utah Supreme Court, requesting that it resolve the
issue of whether the Utah Liability Reform Act allows the jury to allocate fault to a
decedent's employer, on a special verdict form, in spite of the Workers' Compensation
grant of immunity. (Order of Certification, at 1-2). The District Court also asked the
Utah Supreme Court to consider whether naming a decedent's employer on the special
verdict form contravenes Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5. (Order of Certification, at 2).
The Utah Supreme Court, on December 17, 1991, granted the United States
District Court, District of Utah's Petition for Certification.
4

Statement of the Facts
The amicus curiae is primarily concerned with the interpretation of the law in
this case. Thus, any factual situation which involves an attempt by the negligent third
party to place an immune entity on the jury's special verdict form in order to apportion
fault would involve the same legal issues as presented here. Because each of the parties'
will submit a detailed statement of facts, the amicus curiae respectfully offers a
statement of facts focusing on the statutes at issue.
The Utah Liability Reform Act governs the issues of fault in personal injury
suits. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37, et. seq. (1992). Passed in 1986, the Act did away
with the principle of contributory negligence which barred a plaintiff from bringing
suit if he or she contributed to the injury.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1992). The

law now provides that the plaintiff may recover from a defendant or group of defendants
whose negligence exceeds that of the plaintiff's. Id. In addition each defendant is liable
for its proportionate share of the fault and damages. §§ 78-27-38 and 43. Section 39
gives the jury responsibility for determining the total fault and damages and then
dividing that amount proportionally between each plaintiff and each defendant. §78-2739.

When initially proposed, § 39 included wording that would allow the jury, in

making these determinations, to look beyond the plaintiff and defendant to "each other
person whose fault contributed to the injury or damages." S.B. No. 64, attached as
Addendum 2. That language was deliberately deleted from the enacted law. Section 43
prohibits the court from "affect[ing] or impairing] any common law or statutory
immunity from liability."

§78-27-43.

Specifically included in this prohibition is the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. Id-

5

Chapter 30, Title 63 constitutes the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-30-1, et. seq. (1989). The Legislature passed the Act in 1965. It defines
the circumstances under which the government may claim immunity. Section 63-30-3
safeguards all governmental entities from suit for injury resulting from the exercise of
governmental function and while involved in other specified activities.

The section

grants this immunity subject to the remaining provisions of the Act.
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Workers* Compensation Act in 1917. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 35-1-1, et. seq. (1988).

Section 35-1-60 allows an injured employee

to collect compensation benefits from his or her employer if the injury can be
statutorily linked to employment.

§ 35-1-60.

The section further provides that the

collection of benefits under the Act is the exclusive remedy against the employer; in
other words, the employer is shielded from all civil liability relating to the injury, Id.
The Act explicitly retains, however, the injured employee's right to bring suit against
any negligent third person. Id. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employer
cannot be considered at "fault."
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The central issue in this case, simply put, is can an immune entity be
apportioned fault and if so who should bear that burden? By requesting that a person
from whom the plaintiff cannot recover be added to the special verdict form, negligent
third parties seek to shrug off this liability and place it on the injured individual. Such
a procedure contravenes the policies and procedures underlying three statutory schemes:
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and the Utah
Liability Reform Act.
In passing each of these Acts, the Legislature carefully contemplated the
competing interests of the injured individual, the immune entity, society, and the
6

negligent third party.

In the resulting balance, immunity is preserved.

Moreover,

while the Workers' Compensation Act and the Utah Governmental Immunity Act consider
the needs of the injured individual, no such attention is given the negligent third party.
To allocate fault to an immune entity destroys the stability painstakingly created in Utah
law granting that protection.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the judiciary must give effect to
the intent of the Legislature.

Although other jurisdictions may apply rules different

from those written into Utah Statutes, Utah courts will respect and comply with the
plain meaning of Utah statutory language. The language of the Utah Liability Reform Act
unquestionably shields the immune entity from allocation of fault. Utah Code Ann. §§ 7827-37, et. seq. (1992). Sections 37 and 43 remove immune individuals from the scope
of the Act both by definition and by explicit edict.

Furthermore, § 39 governs how total

fault is to be determined and allocated; it limits those considered to each person seeking
recovery and each defendant. Clearly, the total amount of fault cannot include actions
taken by an immune entity.
The legislative history of the Utah Liability Reform Act supports this
interpretation. Drafters of the predecessor Senate Bill deliberately removed language
that would expand those who could be considered by the jury in determining the total
fault. Originally the bill provided that "each other person whose fault contributed to the
injury or damages" would be part of the calculation. Removal of this language evidences
legislative intent to limit apportionment to plaintiffs and defendants.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the narrow issue of
whether an immune entity can be placed on the special verdict form, past decisions by
Utah courts confirm a commitment to immunity explicitly granted under Utah law.
Similarly, jurisdictions with laws similar to Utah's Liability Reform Act reject
7

attempts to compromise immunity even to the extent of allowing a jury to compare the
immune person's conduct for the purpose of allocating damages to the defendants. As
between the immune entity and the negligent third party, their conduct and legal
liability stands on different ground, supported by different social policies-they cannot
be compared.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1: ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER AN IMMUNE ENTITY'S
ROLE WHEN APPORTIONING FAULT UNDERMINES THE POLICIES
PROTECTED BY UTAH LAW.

As early as 1917, with the passage of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, and
more currently in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Utah legislature carved out
and protected from tort liability certain entities.
(1988);

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1989).

See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60

Recently, the legislature reaffirmed

these intentional grants of immunity in the Utah Liability Reform Act.
Annotated § 78-27-43 (1992) resolutely states:

Utah Code

"Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through

78-27-42 affects or impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability,
including, but not limited to, governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title
63, and the exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35 ...." Underpinning each
entitlement to immunity, lies a delicate balance of competing interests. The legislature
has struck this balance based upon its assessment of what social policies must be given
priority.

A. The Utah Workers' Compensation Act balances in an industrial setting the competing
policies and interests deemed most important by the Utah legislature.

8

The competing interests in the Utah Workers' Compensation Act arise in the
context of industrial accidents. Thus those impacted include not only the injured worker
and the negligent party, but also the employer and the public as a whole.
When an injury occurs at the work place, the employee's primary interest, for
example, lies in receiving full compensation for his or her injuries.
negligent party wants to limit its liability.

In contrast, the

Although the employer, like the negligent

third party, strives to limit its liability, its concerns also involve retaining and
attracting employees so that production can continue efficiently. The public's interests
partake of both those of the employer (the continued efficient flow of goods) and those of
the employee (compensating the injured so that they do not become wards of ihe state).
Worker's Compensation legislation strikes a balance among most of these
interests with a concession from each of the parties.

Professor Arthur Larson, the

author of the principle treatise on Workers' Compensation defines it as:

"[A]

mechanism for providing cash wage benefits and medical care to victims of workconnected injuries, and for placing the cost of these injuries ultimately on the
consumer, through the medium of insurance, whose premiums are passed on in the cost
of the product."

Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation. 37

Cornell L. Q. 206, 206 (1952).

The public then, as consumers, secures both the

continued flow of goods and the satisfaction of having the injured worker compensated. It
pays the price for these benefits in the increased cost of products J

1

Professor Larson also notes: "The ultimate 'social philosophy,1 then, behind
nonfault compensation liability is the desirability of providing, in the most efficient, most
dignified, and most certain form, financial benefits which an enlightened community would feel
obliged to provide In any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of
these payments to the most appropriate source [i.e. the consumers of the product]." 1 A.
Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation. § 2.20 (1990).

9

The employer also pays a cost to see its interest protected by the Workers'
Compensation formula.

In exchange for immunity from tort liability, the employer

agrees to pay the injured employee statutory benefits.

Regardless of whether the

employer, in any sense, caused the injury, it must pay the benefits and it must be
considered fault free.? As several scholars have noted, this is an important quid pro quo.
Professor Lawrence P. Wilkins explains:
The probability that most employers will eventually be required to
finance payment of compensation benefits and medical expenses in more
instances where they are not at fault than where they are at fault might be
viewed as an adequate quid pro quo for permitting the occasional faulty
employer to escape accountability.
Wilkins, The Indiana Comparative Fault Act at First (Lingering) Glance. 17 Indiana Law
Review 687, 754 (1984).3
As for the injured employee, he or she receives some "small, but assured,
remedy,"4 and in turn gives up the right to bring suit against the employer.

Upon

establishing that the injury occurred because of, arising out of, or in the course of
employment, the worker recovers these benefits automatically. See. Utah Code Ann. §351-60 (1988).

By surrendering the right to bring a damage suit against the employer,

the employee becomes an indispensable part of the quid pro quo policies embodied in
Workers' Compensation legislation.

2

Professor Larson states: "The liability that rests upon the employer [for benefit
payments] is an absolute liability irrespective of negligence, and this is the only kind of liability
that can devolve upon him whether he is negligent or not. tt 2A A. Larson, supra note 1 at §
76.20 (emphasis added).
3

See also 2A A. Larson, supra note 1, at § 71.20 ("The employer has made
substantial concession as the price of his limited liability ....").
4

1 A. Larson, supra note 1, at § 1.10 (1990).

10

Thus, it is these policies which legislatures, including Utah's, deem most
important: that the employee be compensated, that the employer be given immunity, and
that the consuming public carry the burden of Workers' Compensation while receiving
the products of industry. Significantly, in making the choice of how best to accomplish
these objectives, the legislature gives no recognition to the negligent third party's
interests. See, e.g.. Sneed v. Belt. 130 Ariz. 229, 235, 635 P.2d 517, 523 (Ariz. App.
1981) ("The workmen's compensation act was not designed with the intent of protecting
the third party's interest."); Jones v. Carborundum Co.. 515 F. Supp. 559, 561 ( W.D.
Penn 1981) ("... this exception to the general tort principle of liability based upon
negligence is a bargain between employer and employee alone and does not bind third
parties either for weal or woe.").5

In fact, in no other place does Utah's Workers'

Compensation Act mention negligent third parties except to safeguard the injured
employee's right to sue.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988)("When any injury or

death ... shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an
employer ... the injured employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim
compensation and ... may also have an action for damages against such third person.").

&

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act balances in a governmental context the

competing policies and interests deemed most important by the Utah legislature,
Like the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
also contains a balance of competing interests.

Government officials, the public,

injured individuals, and the negligent third party each can claim some interest in
accidents arising within a government sponsored context.

5

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney

See also. 2A Larson, supra, note 1 at § 71.20 (tt[A]s between the employee and the
stranger, there has been no such give and take, no such compromises struck, as between the
employee and his own employer .... But the stranger has given up nothing, and hence has a right
to claim nothing resembling the immunities that exist between employer and employee/).
11

General of Michigan since 1962, explains that the government and, by derivation, the
public have an interest in defending lawsuits which may pose a threat to a state's fiscal
integrity. He adds:
The State is charged with the responsibility of performing unique
functions that individual or companies either cannot or should not
provide. In law enforcement, building and repairing highways, and caring
for the severely mentally impaired, the State is acting in the public good,
fulfilling duties that by their nature can be dangerous, and for which
there should be limited liability.
Kelley,

The Need for State Immunity From Suit. 1983 Det. C.L. Rev. 1321, 1323

(1984).
The United States Supreme Court , in Barr v. Matteo. provides another policy
reason for governmental immunity:
[Officials of government should be free to exercise their duties
unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the
course of those duties-suits which would consume time and energies
which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat
of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective
administration of policies of government.
360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
The other parties in a government setting have interests mirroring those in
Workers' Compensation contexts.

The injured individual, for example, seeks

compensation for the harm caused to him or her. The public has interests parallel to
that of the victim (to see that he or she receives some compensation and thereby avoids
becoming destitute or an object of charity) and of the government (to see that the state
continues to function efficiently).

Finally, the negligent third party's interest

continues to be that of minimizing its liability.
Governmental immunity laws balance these interests, giving those with the most
important societal policies preference. Most states limit the amount of immunity which

12

a government official may claim. Thus, the government worker cannot shield all actions
behind a cloak of immunity. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (waiver of immunity
as to contractual obligations); § 63-30-6 (waiver of immunity as to actions involving
property); § 63-30-7 (waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of
motor vehicles); etc. In these situations, the injured person reserves the right to bring
suit.
For those acts which retain governmental immunity, however, important social
policies exist. Judge Learned Hand expressed them this way:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact
guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other
personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape
liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in
practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to
deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to
know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and
that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the
unflinching discharge of their duties. ... As is so often the case, the answer
must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either

alternative- In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those
who trv to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.
Gregoire v. Biddle. 177 F.2d 579, 581 (1949), quoted in Barr v. Matteo. 360 U.S.
564, 571-72 (1959)(emphasis added).
Statutes granting the government immunity do not prohibit the injured person
from bringing suit against others who have caused the harm. These negligent third
parties receive no protection of privilege by virtue of the government's immunity. As
in Workers' Compensation, the balance achieved in no way changes the position of the
negligent third party.
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C. Allowing a jury to assess fault to an immune entity damages important balances and
objectives intentionally created bv Utah's legislature.
Given the complexity of the interests and policies involved in both the
Governmental rmmunity and Workers' Compensation Acts, and the deliberateness with
which the legislature has worked to achieve an appropriate balance, tampering with
either scheme would seem, at the least, unwise. Allowing the jury in a case against a
negligent third party to apportion the "fault" of an immune party undermines the
policies and balances in a number of ways.
In the most fundamental sense, once an entity is granted immunity it cannot be
allocated fault since as far as it is concerned, fault has already been decreed nonexistent.
Thus, although both the immune person and the negligent third party may have
contributed to the injured individual's harm, the legislature has determined that they
stand on different ground. The immune entity simply cannot be jointly liable, even for
the sole purpose of determining a defendant's share of damages,6 to the victim. If the
victim retains some sort of claim upon the immune entity, for example through
Workers' Compensation, that claim necessarily must be of an entirely different nature
than one for damages in tort. See Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff Signal Drilling Co.. 658
P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Utah 1983) (reaffirming that in compliance with the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act, an "employer's liability to an employee injured in the
scope and course of employment is not based on tort law."); Phillips v. Union Pac. R.
Co.. 614 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah 1980) (noting that the employer and negligent party's
"respective liabilities are grounded upon different social issues sought to be recognized

6

Evans v. Schenk Cattle Co.. Inc.. 558 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ind. App. 1 Dist. 1990) ("The
reduction of an award based on the employer's conduct amounts to an allocation of fault to the
employer. This is prohibited by Indiana's Comparative Fault Law because a claimant's employer
cannot be considered a nonparty. [The law] allows for allocation of fault only to the claimant,
the defendant, and any person who is a nonparty .") (omitting citations to Indiana law).
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by the legislature when it adopted legislation dealing with Workmen's Compensation. ...
The liability of the employer is not tort liability at all....").7
Protecting the immune entity from a comparison of fault is more than merely
semantics; it preserves, in a very real and practical sense, the integrity of the
underlying legislative schemes.

In other words,

apportioning "fault" to an immune

entity tears at the seams of jurisprudence which aims at producing the most good for the
community.

If the court allows the jury to assess fault against the employer, the

resulting impact on the employer, the injured individual, and the Workers'
Compensation and Governmental Immunity Acts are of the very nature which the
legislature sought to avoid.
The employer, for example, could find itself forced to appear in every tort suit
involving an accident at the work place. In so doing, however, the employer loses some
of the protection afforded by the quid pro quo in Workers' Compensation. Rather than
the time-honored grant of immunity, it would be faced with having to defend itself
against allegations of liability.

By failing to assert a defense the employer could

confront, for example, increased workers' compensation insurance premiums, a
damaged reputation for safety procedures and environment, disruption between employeeemployer relations, loss of shareholder support, etc. Yet, as the Utah Supreme Court
once observed, "[ujnder the act, the employer has no defense he can assert, and any tort
liability or complete freedom therefrom on the part of an employer is not issuable or
assertable ...."

Curtis v. Harmon Electronic. Inc.. 552 P.2d 117, 118 (Utah

1976)(emphasis added).

7

See also. Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers' Compensation
Employer. 1982 Duke L.J. 483, 488 ("The claim of the employee against the employer is
solely for statutory benefits; his claim against the third person is for damages. The two are
different in kind and cannot result in a common liability.").
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Moreover, although the employer stands defenseless, nonetheless it must pay the
costs of defense in being represented before the court and jury. It is these additional
expenses that Workers' Compensation seeks to avoid. Not only does the Act implicitly
reject the extra burden of court costs, the employers and their insurance carriers do not
include these expenses in calculating premiums.8
Concerning the injured individual, including an immune employer on the special
verdict form requires the employee to bear an unfair portion of the total fault.

In

reaching through the immune barrier created by Workers' Compensation, the jury
pulls in an amount of fault which cannot be assigned to the employer, because of
immunity, or to the negligent third party. As a consequence, the injured employee, even
if innocent of all negligence, must bear the costs of that fault. Thus, for example, if the
jury awards the injured party $100,000 in damages and determines that the third
party caused 70% and the employer caused 30% of the fault, the negligent third party
will pay $70,000 and the innocent victim will be left to bear the rest.9 Nowhere in the
Workers* Compensation Act, nor in the Utah Liability Reform Act does it contemplate
that the injured party bear this burden. 10

8 Jones v. Carborundum Co.. 515 F. Supp. 559, 563 (W.D.Pa. 1981) ("A possible
policy consideration which may have been contemplated by the legislature in support of the
provisions adopted [granting employers immunity from suit] ... is the facilitation of cost
computations by employers and their insurance carriers.").
9 The employee must unfairly bear the employer's share of jury-assessed fault even if
he or she contributed to the harm. In the example given in the text, the third party might
cause 70%, the employer 20%, and the employee 10% of the damage. With a $100,000
award, the third party would still only pay $70,000 and the employee, having assumed
responsibility for $10,000, must also bear the $20,000 burden caused by allocating fault to
the employer.
10

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court not only has rejected an interpretation that would
require the injured employee to bear the employer's fault, it has further held that the burden
must fairly lie upon the negligent third party. Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp.. 502 Pa.
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In addition to carrying an unfair portion of the total fault, allocating fault to the
employer reduces the employee's recovery twice.

Because Workers1 Compensation

provides an exclusive remedy, the employee cannot recover any damages the jury might
apportion to the employer.

In addition, from the amount the negligent third party pays

in compensation, the employee must repay the amount of benefits paid by the
employer.^
Because of the impact on the employer and the injured employee in a situation
where the jury apportions fault to the employer, perhaps the most serious damage is to
the Workers' Compensation system itself. As discussed above, Workers' Compensation
is based upon a quid pro quo formula.12 Yet, when the jury weighs the employer's fault,
both the employer and the employee lose something from that formula. The resulting
clash between the nonfault and the comparative fault systems would create pressure for

101, 109, 465 A.2d 609, 613 (1983) ("The Workers' Compensation Act demonstrates a clear
legislative intent that in cases where a party other than the employer is responsible in whole or
in part for an employee's injury, the employee mav recover full compensation for his injury
from the negligent third party, subject to the employer's right of subrogation ....")(emphasis
added).
11 Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988) states in part: "If any recovery is obtained
against such third person it shall be disbursed as follows: ... (2) The person liable for
compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made less the proportionate
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).n
S£& Hill v. Metropolitan Trucking. Inc.. 659 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ind. 1987). In HNi the
federal district court discussed a prior version of Indiana comparative fault law and stated:
Under the original version of Indiana's comparative fault law, a fault-free
plaintiff suing a third party for injuries suffered in the course of his
employment would have faced the prospect that the jury would apportion fault
to the employer. Because the workers' compensation laws provide an
exclusive remedy, the plaintiff could not recover that share of his damages
apportioned to his employer. Further, the employer could enforce its lien on
the share of damages recovered from the third party, further reducing the
plaintiffs recovery. The 1984 amendments cured this inequity by defining
"nonparty" and excluding the claimant's employer.
1& at 433.
12

See supra notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text.
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comprehensive modification of the Workers' Compensation Act. The delicate legislative
balancing, the attempt to give the employer, employee, and public some measure of fair
treatment would be lost. Employer incentive and support for the Act would be reduced.
And, certainly many or tne efficiencies built into Workers' Compensation would be
missing.t3
Notwithstanding the multitude of problems caused by allowing the jury to weigh
the immune entity's fault, the negligent third party might insist that it isn't fair to do
otherwise.

Such an argument ignores the complexity of our legal system and the

balancing required to achieve the best measure of fairness over time, for all.

As

Professor Larson notes: "A legal system must have some element of consistency and
predictability, which means that it cannot necessarily be swayed by whatever seems to
be the fairest result from one moment to the next."14

Fairness to the negligent third

party by apportioning fault to the employer "ignor[es] the fact that one, the employer,
has already made concessions and assumed liabilities to the employee ...."15 Moreover,
since most third party defendants are also employers they therefore benefit generally
from a decision which refuses to regard employer fault. Finally, fairness viewed in the
context of both the Workers' Compensation Act and the Liability Reform Act dictates that
employer immunity be absolutely preserved:
Unfortunately, if such defendants are permitted to reduce their liability
by forcing the worker to accept a verdict apportioned to the "fault" of the
employer, the compensation function of the comparative fault system
would be undermined. If they are permitted to reduce their liability by

13 Wilkins, The Indiana Comparative Fault Act at First (Lingering) Glance. 17 Indiana
Law Review 687, 753 (1984).
14

Larson, supra note 7 at 538.

15 l £ at 539.
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obtaining reimbursement from the employer in proportion to the
employer's "fault," the nonfault basis of the workers' compensation
system would be undermined. Given the worker's injury and the
employer's contributions to the workers' compensation system, the
equities favor the worker, the employer, and the third party defendant, in
that order. If fairness follows equity, the Act has struck the correct
balance.
Wilkins, aujaca note 13, at 754 n.301.

POINT 2: SOUND JUDICIAL POLICY SUPPORTS CLEAR LEGISLATIVE
INTENT, SUCH AS THAT EMBODIED IN THE LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF
THE UTAH LIABILITY REFORM ACT
In 1989 the Utah Supreme Court observed:
This Court seeks to construe laws so as to carry out the legislative
intent while avoiding constitutional conflicts. However, in seeking a
constitutional construction, we will not rewrite a statute or ignore its
plain intent. "A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that
unambiguous language in the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to
contradict its plain meaning.
Provo City Corp. v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989)(citations omitted). See

alsfl, American Coal Co, v, Sandstrom, 699 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) ("The Court's
primary responsibility in construing legislation is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature.").
The Court, in Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983) applied this principle
of statutory construction in a case where, similar to this one, competing interests and
fairness16 underlay the conflict. There, the trial court had awarded damages to the
plaintiff for injury to crops and irrigation pipe caused by the trespass of defendant's
cattle. The defendant appealed, claiming that Utah's fencing statute, which provided that

16

Even in cases where fairness lies at the core of the decision, the judiciary must give
effect to the legislative intent evidenced in clear statutory language. Camp v. Office of
Recovery Services. 779 P.2d 242, 245 (Utah App. 1989) (recognizing that although it may
work harsh results in some instances, "courts are not free to disregard the plain meaning of
statutory language ....").
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the cattle owner is liable for damages caused by trespassing cattle unless a county
ordinance states otherwise, was unconstitutional. He further argued, as Defendants have
here, that other states follow a better approach.

In response, the Court insightfully

explained its role andlhat of the legislature:
Utah has both open range land and large areas of crop land. Even
though some other states have reversed the common law rule and require
livestock to be fenced out of crop land, it is clearly reasonable for the
legislature to allocate liability as it has by allowing the counties to enact
fencing ordinances and, in the absence of such an ordinance, by providing
that the owners of trespassing livestock should be liable. Defendant's
argument that the plaintiffs should have the duty to fence livestock out
should be made to the county under § 4-25-7 or, in lieu of that, to the
Legislature. I t is not the function of this Court to evaluate the wisdom
or practical necessity of legislative enactments." It is the power and

responsibility of the Legislature to enact laws to promote the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare of society, and this Court wji|
not substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature with respect to

what best serves the public interest. The adjustment and accommodation
of conflicting interests, such as are involved in this case, are for the
Legislature to resolve, irrespective of the rules applied by other states.
Id. at 956 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
In this case, the language and history of the Utah Liability Reform Act stand as
clear beacons of legislative intent. The Act's relevant sections provide as follows:
•78-27-37.
Definitions
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.

•78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar
recovery by that person. He mav recover from anv defendant or group of
defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to
any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of
fault attributable to that defendant.
•78-27-39.
of fault.

Separate special verdicts on total damages and proportion
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The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct
the jury, if any to find separate special verdicts determining the total
amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeKing recovery and to each defendant.
•78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault - N o
contribution.
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage
or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution
from any other person.
•78-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the
litigation, may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or
contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective proportion of fault.

•78-27-43.
Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity,
contribution.
Nothing in §§ 79-27-37 through 79-27-42 affects or impairs
any common law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not
limited to governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30. Title 63.
and the exclusive remedy provision of Chapter 1. Title 35. Nothing in §§
78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity
or contribution arising from statute, contract, or agreement.
Taken together, the sections create a distinct formula for who may be assessed
fault, how that fault is to be determined, and how the damages are to be divided. Section
78-27-37 removes immune entities from the possibility
cannot be defendants.

of tort liability; they simply

Section 78-27-43 reinforces their right to immunity.

Sections

78-27-38 through 41 provide the parameter for how fault may be determined and the
damages divided among the defendants.
The first part of the formula, § 38, determines whether the plaintiff's
negligence will allow recovery.

It emphasizes that Utah no longer recognizes

contributory negligence nor joint and several liability.
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It further states that the each

defendant's fault will be determined proportionally, according to how much harm each
contributed.

This calculation-the total fault and the resulting proportion, requires

reference to § 39.
In § 39, the Act furnishes a method for determining damages and fault: the jury
decides total damages, total fault, and then apportions the fault to the plaintiff and each of
the defendants.

The third part of the formula, § 40, abolishes contribution and

reiterates that the defendants will only be liable for damages equal to that proportion of
fault which the jury assigns to each. Finally, for defendants concerned that they may be
assessed more than their share of the fault and damages, § 41 provides for the joinder of
other defendants.
Expressed in formula style, the provisions of the Utah Liability Reform Act
would appear as follows:

1. Under §38, can the plaintiff recover?:

rc's fault < any A's or As' fault = n can recover

2.

Under §§ 39 & 41, what is the total fault?

Total fault = % ris fault + % each A's fault + % each joined A's fault

3. Under §§ 39, 40, & 41, what is the amount of damages each defendant
bears?

each A's damages = total damages x % of that A's fault

As can be readily seen, the provisions make no room for either joinder or apportionment
of fault to an immune entity. Indeed, §§ 37 and 43 forbid it.
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When the plain language of the statute, as in this case, provides a clear indication
of how the statute is to be construed, the court will give effect to the legislature's intent.
See, e.g.. Horton v. The Royal Order of the Sun. 175 Utah Adv Rep. 4, 5 (Utah 1991)
("The general rule of statutory construction is that where the statutory language is plain
and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine legislative
intent.");

Allison v.

American

Legion

Post

No.

134. 763 P.2d 806, 809

(Utah 1988)(MWe are guided by the rule that a statute should be construed according to
its plain language."). See also. Smeddon v. Graham. 175 Utah Adv Rep. 13, 15 (Ct App.
1991).
Even if the Utah Liability Reform Act failed to provided on its face a clear
indication of legislative intent to protect immunity entities from an assessment of fault,
the legislative history also provides further evidence of this purpose. Prior to passing
the Act as it now reads, the legislature considered an earlier version of §78-27-39, the
section defining the persons to whom the jury can apportion fault and damages. Senate
Bill No. 64 became the Utah Liability Reform Act.

In an

earlier version,

the bill

contained the following language:
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct
the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total
amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to

each other person whose fault contributed to the injury or damagesSee Addendum 2 (original emphasis removed, existing emphasis added). Note that with
the exception of the emphasized language, the wording is identical to current §78-2739.

Using the deleted portion, the jury could look beyond the plaintiff(s) and

defendant(s) in calculating the fault and damage formula. The fact that the legislature
intentionally eliminated this possibility is powerful evidence that no one but plaintiffs
and defendants can be considered in apportioning fault.
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POINT 3: COURTS IN THE MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS, INCLUDING
UTAH, PROTECT THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF THE IMMUNE ENTITY
AGAINST THOSE OF THE NEGLIGENT DEFENDANT.
"The great majority of jurisdictions have held that the employer whose
concurring negligence contributed to the employee's injury cannot be sued or joined by
the third party as a joint tortfeasor, whether under contribution statutes or at common
law.M

Larson, supra, note 7 at 488 (emphasis added).

Utah is* one of those

jurisdictions.
It might be argued that the issue in this case is narrower, that of allowing the
jury to apportion fault to the immune entity without actual joinder.

Yet, the principle

remains the same: preserving the complete immunity intentionally granted under Utah
law. Although decided before passage of the Utah Liability Reform Act, Curtis v. Harmon
Electronic. Inc.. 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976) illustrates the Utah Supreme Court's
commitment to the broad immunity granted under Utah Workers' Compensation.
In Curtis, an employee was injured while riding as a passenger with a co-worker
who drove broadside into a freight car. The employee sued, and the Railroad moved to
join the employer on a theory of contribution. In reversing the trial court's granting of
joinder, the Court stated that the issue centered on whether the Workers' Compensation
Act was broad enough to preempt any recovery by anyone, including the defendants.
Noting that the Act prohibited the employer from being named as a defendant, the court
held that neither could the employer be named as a joint tort-feasor.
described the Act as a "clear interdiction"

It emphatically

against all other civil liability.

Curtis, at

119. The Court added that "no good purpose would be served" in allowing the negligent
third party to assert a claim of negligence against the employer in light of the
"magnitude and almost all-encompassing declaration of rights and remedies under the
[Workers' Compensation] act." Id..
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Later, in Phillips v. Union Pac. R. Co.. 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980), the Court
again addressed the competing interests of the immune employer and the negligent third
party. As in Curtis, the defendant attempted to join the employer and a co-worker as
third parties.

In rejecting this encroachment on immunity granted under Workers'

Compensation, the Court stressed:
The exclusive remedy provision of ... the Utah ... Workmen's
Compensation Act, along with the cases interpreting those provisions,
make it clear that an employer's only liability for injuries sustained by
an employee is the extent of benefits under the Act. Additional exposure
through the indirect method of a third-party action would be a blatant

violation of expressed legislative policy,
614 P.2d at 154 (emphasis added).
Although Utah has yet to rule on the narrower issue, jurisdictions with
comparative negligence laws similar to Utah's have ruled that the immunity granted
under state law remains inviolable throughout the judicial process. Thus it cannot be
pierced even for the purpose of apportioning fault among the defendants.
The Indiana Comparative Fault Statute, like Utah's, determines fault on a
percentage basis in order to fairly distribute liability among the parties.

Also

comparable to Utah law, the Indiana Statute limits which persons may be apportioned
fault. As discussed above, Utah allows the jury in apportioning damages to consider only
the fault of the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39.

In

comparison, the Indiana statute permits the jury to consider the liability of the
plaintiff(s), the defendant(s), and any "nonparty."

LC. 34-4-33-5.

Indiana Code 34-

4-33-2 defines a nonparty as: "A person who is or may be liable to the claimant in
part or in whole for the damages claimed but who has not been joined in the action as a
defendant by the claimant. A nonparty shall not include the employer of the claimant."

25

In Handrow v. Cox. 553 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. App. 4 Dist. 1990) the Indiana Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether an immune government entity could be considered
a nonparty and thereby be assessed a portion of the fault. The plaintiffs, in this case,
received serious injuries when a truck skidded on an icy overpass and ended up in their
lane of traffic. Unable to stop, due to road conditions, the plaintiffs collided with the
truck. The trial court ruled that the State of Indiana, although immune from liability
under governmental immunity, was a nonparty whose negligence could be considered in
apportioning damages to the defendant.

The plaintiffs appealed, contending that an

immune entity could not be considered a nonparty.
In reviewing the history of the Indiana Comparative Statute provisions defining
nonparty, the Court of Appeals observed:
[T]he original Act permitted the allocation of fault to an immune party
even though there could be no recovery from that party. To the extent
such an immune person contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, those
injuries were to remain uncompensated. This inequity was remedied by
the 1984 amendment which defined a nonparty as a person who "is, or
may be liable to the claimant." Thus, it is clear the legislature intended
to remove immune parties from the comparative fault scheme.
Id. at 855 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
The issue in Handrow focused on governmental immunity. Courts interpreting
Indiana law, however, have reached the same conclusion in employer and other immunity
cases. See e.g.. Evans v. Schenk Cattle Co.. Inc.. 558 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ind. App. 1 Dist.
1990) ("The reduction of an award based on the employer's conduct amounts to an
allocation of fault to that employer. This is prohibited by Indianan's Comparative Fault
Law because a claimant's employer cannot be considered a nonparty."); Farmers &
Merchants State Bank v. Norfolk & Western Ry Co.. 673 F. Supp. 946, 948 (N.D. Ind.
1987) (Affirming that "a person who is immune from suit cannot be a nonparty under
Indiana's Comparative Fault Statute because such person cannot be 'a person who is, or
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may be, liable to the claimant.' Therefore, such person cannot be considered in any fault
distribution process.")(emphasis in original).

Utah's definition of a defendant ("any

person not immune from suit, who is claimed to be liable") prohibits allocation of fault
to immune parties in the same way that Indiana's definition of nonparty does.
Nevada's comparative negligence statute also bears a striking similarity to
Utah's.

Section 41.141(4) states that where "recovery is allowed against more than

one defendant in such an action ... each defendant is severally liable to the plaintiff only
for that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence
attributable to him.M
In Warmbrodt V, Blanchard, 100 Nev. 703, 692 P.2d 1282 (1985), the Nevada
Supreme Court interpreted this section to mean that persons who cannot be held liable
for the suffered injury also cannot appear on the jury's verdict form. The plaintiffs in
that case sold their business and for failure to timely liquidate the corporation, suffered
a double taxation.

They brought suit against their accountants and their attorneys,

alleging negligence and malpractice.

Prior to trial the attorneys moved for summary

judgment and the court granted the motion. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge gave
the jury an instruction requiring them to compare the negligence of the attorneys, the
plaintiffs, and the accountants. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing among other things, that
the attorneys should not have appeared on the verdict form.
The Nevada Supreme Court addressed this issue of apportionment and held that
The plain language of the comparative negligence statute required
apportioning of liability "among the defendants" and then only "[wjhere
recovery is allowed against more than one defendant" in an action. The
statutory scheme provided for comparison of the plaintiff's negligence
with that of the "person or persons against whom recovery is sought," or
alternatively stated, that "of the defendant or combine negligence of
multiple defendants." ... No reference was made to the negligence of other
possible tortfeasors.
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Warmbrodt. 100 Nev. at 708, 692 P.2d at 1286 (emphasis in original, citations
omitted). Although other portions of the Nevada Comparative Negligence Statute have
been modified, this language remains intact. Thus, like the Utah comparative scheme, in
apportioning damages the jury can compare only the fault of the plaintiff and the
defendant.17
CONCLUSION
By completely safeguarding the immune entity from any allocation of fault, the
Court will protect the societal principles embodied in immunity laws, will decline to
cripple the time-honored policies contained in the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, and
will uphold the legislative intent so clearly expressed in the language and history of the
Utah Liability Reform Act.
The conflict in this case focuses on the competing interests of the employer,
employee and public, against those of the negligent third party. Professor Larson has

17

Other jurisdictions with laws more varied than Utah's have nonetheless continued to
reject attempts to compare the role of immune entities in apportioning damages. See e.g..
Downie v. Kent Products. Inc.. 420 Mich. 197, 224, 362 N.W. 2d 605, 618 (1984) (placing the
employer on the special verdict form in order to reduce defendant's liability to plaintiff
amounts to error); Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp.. 502 Pa. 101, 106, 465 A.2d 609,
612 (1983) (Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Act does not reflect an intent to permit
joinder of an employer as an additional defendant for the purpose of apportioning fault). £f.
Mills v. Brown. 303 Or. 228, 227, 735 P.2d 603, 606 (1987) ("Nothing in these changes [the
1975 Amendments] would indicate any intent by the legislature to have the trier of fact
consider the fault of anyone not a party to the action when making a comparative fault analysis
under ORS 18.470.").
Invariably, jurisdictions permitting the jury to allocate fault to immune entities do so
based on laws very different from those in Utah. The Kansas Comparative Negligence statute,
for example, allows the defendant to join "any other person whose causal negligence is claimed
to have contributed ...." K.S.A. § 44-504 (emphasis added). Similarly, Idaho's Comparative
Negligence Statute, states that the jury can determine the "amount of damages and the
percentage of negligence attributable to each party ...." I.C. § 6-802 (emphasis' added).
Moreover, both Kansas and Idaho's Workers' Compensation Acts limit the amount of protection
afforded the employer. Finally, Oklahoma's Comparative Negligence Statute declares that the
plaintiff's negligence is to be measured against "the negligence of anv persons, firms or
corporations ...." 23 O.S. 1981 § 13 (emphasis added).
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cautioned that the solution to this type of conflict "should be based on what is good for
compensation law.

If products liability law [for example] has got out of hand, the

necessary corrections should be made within the boundaries of products liability law;
they should not be made by distorting long-standing compensation principles completely
out of shape."

Larson, Third-Partv Action Over Against Workers' Compensation

Employer. 1982 Duke L J . 483, 541. Moreover, any "adjustment and accommodation
of conflicting interest, such as are involved in this case, are for the Legislature to
resolve, irrespective of the rules applied by other states." Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d
953, 956 (Utah 1983).
Because the Legislature has spoken to these conflicts by unequivocally protectfng
the immunity granted under Utah law, the amicus curiae prays that this Court will find
that the Utah Liability Reform Act prohibits the trial court from allocating any fault to
immune entities.

DATED this J0_ day of April, 1992.

RaliA L.' De^kgrnup

Q

President
Utah Trial Lawyers Association
Amicus Curiae
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APPENPUM 1

Utah Liability Reform Act
Itah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 (1992)

78-27-35

JUDICIAL CODE

78-27-35. Release, settlement, or statement by injured person — Notice of rescission or disavowal.
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement, if given by mail, is
given when it is deposited in a mailbox, properly addressed with postage
prepaid. Notice of cancellation given by the injured person need not take i
particular form and is sufficient if it indicates by any form of written expres
sion the intention of the injured person not to be bound by the settlement
agreement, liability release, or disavowed statement.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 4.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release § 14
et seq.
C.J.S. — 76 C.J.S. Release § 38 et seq.

78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, settlement, or statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.
The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in
lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise
existing in the law.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5.
Meaning of "this act." — See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-32.

78-27-37.

Definitions.

As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is
authorized to act as legal representative.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former § 78-27-37, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 1, relating to
diminishment of damages and assumption of
risk, and reenacts the above section,
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

78-27-38

NOTES TO DECISIONS
fited in Deats v. Commercial Sec. Bank,
746 P-2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For
comment, "The Liability Reform Act: An Approach to Equitable Application," see 13 J.
Contemp. L. 89 (1987).

A.L.R. — Liability to one struck by golf ball,
53 A.L.R.4th 282.

78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to
special verdicts, and reenacts the above section.

Cross-References. — Product Liability Act,
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration
or modification of product after sale is substantial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5.
Skiers not to make claim against or recover
from ski area operator for injury resulting from
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assumption of risk.
Bailment.
Causation.
Dramshops.
Jury instructions.
Last clear chance.
Open and obvious danger.
Unit method of determining negligence.
Wrongful death.
Cited.
Assumption of risk.
"Assumption of risk," i.e., risk of a known
danger voluntarily assumed, may amount to a
lack of due care constituting negligence; where
such is the case and the party assuming the
risk is the plaintiff in an action governed by
comparative negligence statute, he is chargeable with contributory negligence and is liable
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accordance with its provisions. Kigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah
1977), overruled on other grounds, Moore v.
Burton Lumber & Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865
(Utah 1981).
Assumption of risk language is not appropriate to describe the various concepts previously

dealt with under that terminology but is to be
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory
negligence; when the issue is raised attention
should be focused on whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due care would
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge
of it, and if so, whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which the person seeking to recover acted in light of all the
surrounding circumstances, including the appreciated risk; then, if the unreasonableness of
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be
less than that of the person from whom recovery is sought, any damages allowed should be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Eng'g,
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980).
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk"
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hdwe. Co., %Z\ P.2d %%$ (Utah V&\).
Assumption of risk language is not appropriate in an instruction under comparative negligence statutes. Stephens v. Henderson, 741
P.2d 952 (Utah 1987) (applying statute in effect prior to 1986).
The assumption of risk doctrine has been ex-
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78-27-38

JUDICIAL CODE

pressly abandoned in Utah as a complete bar to
recovery due to its incompatibility with the
comparative negligence system Donahue v
Durfee, 780 P 2d 1275 (Utah Ct App 1989)
Bailment.
The comparative negligence statutes do not
change the rule that the negligence of a bailee
in handling the bailed property is not imputed
to the bailor Otto v Leany, 635 P 2d 410
(Utah 1981)
Causation.
Trial court committed prejudicial error in
submitting to jury question of plaintiffs comparative negligence where his act of alleged
negligence did not in any way contribute to his
injury, although it may have increased severity of damages, comparative negligence becomes a defense for defendant where plaintiffs
negligent conduct was a contributing factor in
causing injury Acculog, Inc v Peterson, 692
P 2 d 728 (Utah 1984)
Dramshops.
The clear intent of the legislature in enacting the Dramshop Act was to compensate innocent third parties by making dramshop owners
strictly liable without regard to the finding of
fault, wrongful intent, or negligent conduct on
their part The doctrine of comparative negligence therefore does not have application to
dramshop defendants Reeves v Gentile, 813
P 2 d 111 (Utah 1991)
The doctrine of comparative negligence has
application in a dramshop case as between the
intoxicated person and the injured parties
Reeves v Gentile, 813 P 2d 111 (Utah 1991)
J u r y instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to confuse or mislead the jury Dixon v Stewart, 658
P 2d 591 (Utah 1982)
Instruction that "ordinarily, a plaintiff in
any action has the duty of seeing and avoiding,
if reasonable, a hazard which is plainly visible,
and if the plaintiff [unreasonably] failed to do
so, then the plaintiff is negligent either in failing to look or in failing to heed what he or she

saw," when read together with all of the othe
instructions given on negligence, was a correct
statement of a plaintiffs duty in negligence action Deats v Commercial Sec Bank, 746 p 2d
1191 (Utah Ct App 1987), cert denied 765
P 2 d 1277 (Utah 1988)
Last clear chance.
With the adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act, the doctrine of last clear chance as a
distinct tort doctrine was extinguished along
with contributory negligence, however, argument to the jury as to whether a party may or
may not have had the last clear chance to avoid
injury is not precluded, and as bearing on
which party was guilty of the greater negligence, last clear chance becomes just one of
many factors to be weighed in the comparison
Dixon v Stewart, 658 P 2d 591 (Utah 1982)
Open and obvious danger.
By establishing a compaiative negligence
system, the legislature has by necessary implication abolished the open and obvious danger
rule as an absolute bar to an injured guest's
recovery Donahue v Durfee, 780 P 2d 1275
(Utah Ct App 1989)
Unit method of determining negligence.
In a medical malpractice case, the 'Wisconsin" method of determining comparative negligence, whereby each defendant's negligence is
compared against the plaintiffs, was rejected
in favor of the "unit" method whereby the negligence of all the defendants is taken together
in making the comparison Jensen v Intermountam Health Care, I n c , 679 P 2d 903
(Utah 1984)
Wrongful death.
The 1973 legislation that abolished the common-law contributory negligence defense and
made comparative negligence the governing
tort principle did not overrule pre-1973 case
law construing the term ' wrongful" in the
wrongful death statute nor did it free a wrongful death plaintiff from the imputation of any
negligent conduct of the decedent Kelson v
Salt Lake County, 784 P 2d 1152 (Utah 1989)
Cited in Warren v Honda Motor Co , 669 F
Supp 365 (D Utah 1987), Western Fiberglass,
Inc v Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P 2d
34 (Utah Ct App 1990)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, A Primer on
Damages Under the Utah Wrongful Death and
Survival Statutes, 1974 Utah L Rev 519
Comment, McGinn v Utah Power & Light
Co — J u r y Blindfolding in Comparative Negligence Cases, 1975 Utah L Rev 569
Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons

in Products Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L Rev
3
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the
Twentieth Century in Tort Law 9 , 1981 Utah L
Rev 495, 496
Mulherm v Ingersoll Utah Adopts Comparative Principles in Strict Products Liability
Cases, 1982 Utah L Rev 461
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Brigham Young Law Review. — The
r g e r of Comparative Fault Principles with
cJrict Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. IngersollZnd Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964, 966.
Damage Apportionment in Accounting Malctice Actions: The Role of Comparative
Fault, 1990 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 949.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For
comment, "The Liability Reform Act: An Aporoach to Equitable Application," 13 J.
Contemp. L. 89 (1987).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 57B Am. Jur. 2d Negligence
§ 1128 et seq.
C.J.S. — 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 169 et
seq.
A.L.R. — Comparative negligence rule
where misconduct of three or more persons is
involved, 8 A.L.R.3d 722.
Retrospective application of state statute
substituting rule of comparative negligence for
that of contributory negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d
1438.
Indemnity or contribution between joint tortfeasors on basis of relative fault, 53 A.L.R.3d
184.
Modern development of comparative negligence doctrine having applicability to negligence actions generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339.
M

78-27-39

Application of comparative negligence doctrine, generally, 86 A.L.R.3d 1206.
Comparative negligence doctrine applied to
actions based on strict liability in tort, 9
A.L.R.4th 633.
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence
rules on assumption of risk and contributory
negligence, 16 A.L.R.4th 700.
Commercial renter's negligence liability for
customer's personal injuries, 57 A.L.R.4th
1186.
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63
A.L.R.4th 221.
Liability for injury incurred in operation of
power golf cart, 66 A.L.R.4th 622.
Tort liability for window washer's injury or
death, 69 A.L.R.4th 207.
Comparative fault: calculation of net recovery by applying percentage of plaintiffs fault
before or after subtracting amount of settlement by less than all joint tortfeasors, 71
A.L.R.4th 1108.
Rescue doctrine: applicability and application of comparative negligence principles, 75
A.L.R.4th 875.
Key N u m b e r s . — Negligence <£= 97 et seq.

78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury,
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to
contribution among joint tortfeasors, and reenacts the above section,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

J u r y instructions.
Cited.
J u r y instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning

to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to confuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 658
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
Cited in Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111
(Utah 1991).
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78-27-40

JUDICIAL CODE

78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
— No contribution.
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant
may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion
of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other
person.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to
settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts
the above section.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Enforcement of contribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 69(h).
Joint obligations, § 15-4-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ployer's employees. Shell
Oil
Co. v.
Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1983).

ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
Indemnity contract.
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Workers' compensation.
Cited.
Applicability of section.
A statute, such as this section, eliminating
joint and several liability may not be applied to
injuries occurring prior to its effective date.
Where the injuries occurred on November 8,
1984, and the Liability Reform Act was not
effective until April 28, 1986, the trial court
was correct in holding t h a t the Liability Reform Act did not apply. Stephens v. Henderson,
741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987).
Indemnity contract.
The former comparative negligence provisions did not invalidate an employer's indemnity contract with a third party whereby employer agreed to indemnify the third party
against claims arising out of injuries to the em-

Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Where plaintiff was awarded a judgment in
action against a defendant to recover the property loss sustained as the result of a collision
between automobiles operated by defendant
and the minor unemancipated daughter of the
plaintiff, and where the daughter's negligence
contributed to the property loss sustained by
her father, the minor daughter was a joint tortfeasor and liable to the defendant for contribution. Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah
1981).
Workers' compensation.
Employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor as to
an injury to his employee covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Curtis v. Harmon
E l e c , Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980).
Cited in Warren v. Honda Motor Co., 669 F.
Supp. 365 (D. Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah Allows Contribution Against Cotortfeasor Despite Immunity from Direct Suit: Bishop v.
Nielsen, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 429.
J o u r n a l of Contemporary Law. — Comment, The Liability Reform Act: An Approach
to Equitable Application, 13 J. Contemp. L. 89
(1987).

A.L.R. — Right of tortfeasor initially causing injury to recover indemnity or contribution
from medical attendant aggravating injury or
causing new injury in course of treatment, 72
A.L.R.4th 231.
Products liability: seller's right to indemnity
from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 278.
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78-27-43

78-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation,
may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of fault.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-41, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 5.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 5 repeals former § 78-27-41, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 5, relating to
rights of contribution and indemnity, and reenacts the above section,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Products liability: seller's right to
indemnity from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th
278.

78-27-42, Release to one defendant does not discharge
other defendants.
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does
not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 6.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 6 repeals former § 78-27-42, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 6, relating to
release of joint tortfeasors and a reduction of
claim, and reenacts the above section,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release § 35
et seq.
C.J.S. — 76 C.J.S. Release § 38 et seq.
A.L.R. — Tortfeasor's general release of cotortfeasor as affecting former's right of contribution against cotortfeasor, 34 A.L.R.3d 1374.
Release of one responsible for injury as affecting liability of physician or surgeon for
negligent treatment of injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 260.
Voluntary payment into court of judgment

against one joint tortfeasor as release of others,
40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Release of one negligently treating injury as
affecting liability of one originally responsible
for injury, 64 A.L.R.3d 839.
Validity and effect of agreement with one
cotortfeasor setting aside his maximum liability and providing for reduction or extinguishment thereof relative to recovery against nonagreeing cotortfeasor, 65 A.L.R.3d 602.

78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to,
governmental immunity as provided in Title 63, Chapter 30, and the exclusive remedy provisions of Title 35, Chapter 1. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37
through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution
arising from statute, contract, or agreement.
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History: C. 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 7.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 7 repeals former § 78-27-43, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 7, relating to
release of joint tortfeasors and contribution,
and reenacts the above section.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1986, ch.

199, § 9 provided: "If any provision of
§§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, or the application of any provisions of those sections to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remaining provisions of those sections shall be
given effect without the invalid provision or
application."

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Right of tortfeasor initially causing injury to recover indemnity or contribution
from medical attendant aggravating injury or
causing new injury in course of treatment, 72
A.L.R4th 231.

Products liability: seller's right to indemnity
from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 278.

78-27-44. Personal injury judgments — Interest authorized.
(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
by any person, resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person,
corporation, association, or partnership, whether by negligence or willful intent of that other person, corporation, association, or partnership, and
whether that injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, the plaintiff in
the complaint may claim interest on the special damages actually incurred
from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action.
(2) It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment for plaintiff in that
action, to add to the amount of special damages actually incurred that are
assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on that
amount calculated at the legal rate, as defined in Section 15-1-1, from the date
of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action to the date of
entering the judgment, and to include it in that judgment.
(3) As used in this section, "special damages actually incurred" does not
include damages for future medical expenses, loss of future wages, or loss of
future earning capacity.
History: L. 1975, ch. 97, § 1; 1991, ch. 123,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the
section; substituted "damages actually incurred" for "damages alleged" in Subsection

(1); substituted "special damages actually incurred that are assessed" for "damages assessed" and "the legal rate, as defined in Section 15-1-1" for "8 % per annum" in Subsection
(2); added Subsection (3); and made changes in
phraseology.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Date for computing interest.
Special damages.
Date for computing interest
Where cause of action occurred in September, 1973, interest at 8% would be computed
from then notwithstanding this section did not
become effective until May 13, 1975, since section explicitly directs all (future) judgments to
add interest computed from the time of the act

giving rise to the cause of action; legislative
intent is that the date of the act giving rise to
the action is in all cases the date used for computing the period of interest. Campbell v.
Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah L979).
Special damages.
Special damages on which prejudgment interest is recoverable are limited to those that
arise in the period between the act giving rise
to the cause of action and entry of judgment in
plaintiffs favor. Gleave v. Denver &
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Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

9
10

Section 1.

enacted

by

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:
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78-27-37.

12

(1)

13

Section 78-27-37, Jtah Code Annotated 1953, as

As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:

"Defendant'1

means

any person not immune from suit who is claimed

to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.

14

(2)

"Fault" means

any

actionable

breach

of

legal

duty,

act,

cr

15

oaission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained

16

by

17

all its

18

liability,

19

liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.

20

a person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in

(3)

degrees,
breach

contributory
of

express

negligence,

2i

rtifliburscment

22

authorized to act as legal representative.

23
24

Section 2.
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own
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"Person seeking recovery" means
on
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any
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seeking

damages
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Section 78-27-38, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

enacted

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:
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The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar

2

recovery by that person.

3

defendants whose fault exceeds his own.

4

any

5

fault attributable to that defendant.

6
7

defendant

or

group

of

However, no defendant is liable to

seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of

Section 3.

Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

enacted

by

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

8
9

person

He may recover from any

78-27-39.
direct

The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall,

the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the

10

total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault

11

attributable to each person seeking recovery, to

12

each other person whose fault contributed to the injury or damages.

13

Section 4.

Section

14

Chapter 209, Laws

15

78-27-40.

each

defendant,

>f Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

Subject tc Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a

defendant may be Liable to any person seeking recovery is

U

or

18

fault

19

contribution from any other person.

21

to

78-27-40, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by

16

20

and

that

percentage

proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
attributed

Section 5.

to

that

Section

defendant.

Ho

defendant

is

entitled

to

78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

22

78-27-41.
the

A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a

party

23

to

litigation, may join as parties any defendants who may have caused

24

or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery

25

the purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault.

-3-

is

sought,

for

SUBSTITUTE S. B, Ho, 64

1
2

Section 6.

Section
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78-27-42, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by

3

A release given by a person

78-27-42.

seeking recovery

4

defendants does not discharge any other defendant

5

provides.

6
7

Section 7.

Section

to one or more

unless

trie

release

78-27-43, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted oy

7

8~?7-43.

Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through

78-27-42

affects

not

**

*"d the exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter I,

12

Sections

13

indemnity or contribution arising from statute, contract, or agreement.

15
16

or

impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but

10

14

so

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:

*
9

resdl

Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1971, is repealed and reenacted to

limited to, governmental

78-27-37

Section 8.

through

immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63,

78-27-42

affects

or

Title

35.

impairs

any

Section 78-27-53, Utah Code AnnotateJ 1953, as

Nothing

in

right

to

enacted

by

Chapter 166, Laws of Utah 1979, is amended to read:
7C-27-53.

Notwithstanding

anything

17

through 78-27-43 to the contrary, no

18

against,

19

any of the inherent rinks of skiing.

or

Section 9.

skier

m

[section] Sections 78-27-37
[sharf • may

make

any

claim

recover from, any ski area operator for injury resulting from

If any provision of Sections 78-27-37 through 73-27-43,

or

SUBSTITUTE S. B. No. 64

1

Section 10. This

01-31-86 4:54 PM

act

takes

effect upon approval by the governor, p r

2

the day following the constitutional time limit

3

without

4

veto override.

the

governorfs

signature,

-5-

of

Article

VII,

Sec. 8

or l"n the case of a veto, the date of
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